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Abstract: The general obligation of non-discrimination enjoys a special place 
within the sources of law of the EU constitutional legal order, up to the point that 
the Court of Justice has ensured its enforcement also beyond the scope of 
application of ordinary EU legal instruments. The Court of Justice has, in fact, 
granted the application of the obligation not to discriminate against the protected 
categories in cases where the applicable legal instrument – directives in particular 
– was not applicable. This incurred when the Court of Justice applied the 
obligation of non-discrimination in cases between two private parties, the 
horizontal direct effect of EU legal instruments. This happened in a recent 
decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Egenberger, where a job 
applicant for a position offered by an auxiliary of the Protestant Church, in 
Germany, appealed the decision of the employer not to hire her on a legal 
consultancy project. The behaviour of the Court, and the enforcement of the 
principle of non-discrimination on the ground of religion, can be considered as 
the affirmation of the specific and fundamental place that non-discrimination on 
the ground of religion occupies in the EU constitutional legal order? How this can 
be reconciled with religious freedom? The article will try to address these 
questions.  
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1. Introduction: the increasing central role of non-discrimination on 
the ground of religion in the case law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union 
 
Art. 13 TEC of the Treaty of Amsterdam1 introduced for the first time a 
legal basis for the adoption of legislative acts to fight discrimination on 
grounds other than nationality. At the same time, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, solemnly proclaimed in 2001, 
which became binding with the entrance into force of the Lisbon Treaty, in 
December 2009, contains an express prohibition of discrimination, inter 
alia, on the ground of religion.2 To this legal framework should be added 
the flourishing secondary legislation, as Directive 2000/78/EC 3  on 
discrimination in the working place and Directive 2000/43/EC4 on racial 
and ethnic discrimination. Despite the abundance of legal provisions, for 
long time there has been little if no application at European level of the 
prohibition of discrimination on the ground of religion, and, as a 
consequence, almost no litigation in front of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union(CJEU). 5  This is most likely attributable to multiple 
                                                             
1 Now Art. 19 TFEU.  
2 See Title III – Equality. In particular Art. 21, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (CFREU): "1. Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, 
colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any 
other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual 
orientation shall be prohibited. 2. Within the scope of application of the Treaties and 
without prejudice to any of their specific provisions, any discrimination on grounds of 
nationality shall be prohibited". 
3 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for 
equal treatment in employment and occupation, OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, p. 16–22. 
4  Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ L 180, 19.7.2000, p. 
22–26. 
5 It should be however recalled that one of the seminal judgments of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (hereinafter CJEU), Van Duyn, had a link with religion. Ms Van 
Duyn was a Dutch employee of the Church of Scientology (whose status as fully-fledged 
religion is however debated) who was denied the permit to enter as a worker in the United 
Kingdom. At that time there was however no legal basis to enter in the dispute if the facts 
of the case were, at the same time, also representing a discrimination on the ground of 
Draft – G. Zaccaroni [to appear on Stato e Chiese, 2019] 
 3 
factors. Discrimination on the ground of religion6 depends strictly on the 
definition of religion, which is not equal along the different Member States. 
At the same time, it depends also on the specific role that religion plays in 
the public sphere in the various Member States, which is often reflected by 
the Constitutional status that religion enjoys in various European 
countries.7 These are some of the reasons that have created, over the years, 
a number of exception to the prohibition of religious discrimination. One 
of these exceptions is at the heart of the dispute: Art. 4.2 of Directive 
2000/78/EC.8  This provision contains a safeguard clause that is addressed 
                                                             
religion. CJEU, Case 41-74, 4 December 1974, Yvonne van Duyn v Home Office, 
EU:C:1974:133. 
6 See e.g. M. HILL (ed.), Religion and Discrimination Law in the European Union, Institute 
for European Constitutional Law, Trier, 2012. L. ZUCCA, A Secular Europe. Law and 
Religion in the European Constitutional Landscape, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012. L. 
ZUCCA, C. UNGUREANU (eds.) Law State and Religion and in the New Europe: 
Debates and Dilemmas, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012. F. CASOLARI, 
L’azione dell’Unione europea contro le discriminazioni basate sulla religione: l’impatto della 
giurisprudenza della Corte europea dei diritti umani in Diritti Umani e Diritto Internazionale, 
2012 vol. 3, p. 475 ss. R. MCCREA, Religion and the Public Order of the European Union, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010. L.N. LEUSTEAN, J.T.S. MADELEY, Religion, 
Politics and Law in the European Union, Routledge, Abingdon, 2009. See also D. 
DURISOTTO, Unione europea, chiese e organizzazioni filosofiche non confessionali (art. 17 
TFUE) in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), 
giugno 2016, p. 8. 
7 In this sense should be seen the difference between at least three different approaches to 
religion in Europe: the purely secularist approach (reflected by France) which does not 
recognize a specific status to any religion; the official recognition of the role played by 
religion (as in Italy or Spain), without an express favour towards a specific religion; and 
States where a specific religion enjoys a recognized constitutional status, as the head of 
State is also the head of the Church (United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden). 
8  Art. 4.2, Directive 2000/78/EC: “Member States may maintain national legislation in 
force at the date of adoption of this Directive or provide for future legislation 
incorporating national practices existing at the date of adoption of this Directive pursuant 
to which, in the case of occupational activities within churches and other public or private 
organisations the ethos of which is based on religion or belief, a difference of treatment 
based on a person's religion or belief shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason 
of the nature of these activities or of the context in which they are carried out, a person's 
religion or belief constitute a genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement, 
having regard to the organisation's ethos. This difference of treatment shall be 
implemented taking account of Member States' constitutional provisions and principles, 
as well as the general principles of Community law, and should not justify discrimination 
on another ground”. 
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into preserving the existing practices connected to religion in employment 
law that could result in a difference of treatment between religious and 
non-religious employees. A clause like the one at hand is not at ease with 
the overall system of protection of fundamental rights at EU level and in 
particular with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
It was accordingly predictable that, with the application of the protection 
agreed by the Charter after its entrance into force, sooner or later, a case 
requiring to find a balance between the prohibition of non-discrimination 
and the freedom of religion of the employer would have reached the Court 
of Justice. It must be said that the rulings of the Luxembourg Court9 have 
been preceded by at least a decade by the European Court of Human 
Rights. The ECHR had several opportunities to rule on discrimination on 
the ground on religion, 10  as well as on the principle of religious 
autonomy.11 Although the protection afforded by the European Union and 
by the Council of Europe systems presents several points in common, 
different approaches to the content of fundamental rights persists.12 As it 
will be outlined along this article, this is one of the cases where the different 
approach emerges. This is linked in particular to the nature of the two legal 
orders: while the Council of Europe is a purely international legal order, 
based on the consensus of the High Contracting Parties, the EU is, on the 
other side, based on the principle of conferred powers. This allowed the 
EU, over the years, to build a quasi-constitutional legal order that applies 
its characterising rights, principles and values also when there might be a 
conflict with their interpretation at national level. This is well represented 
                                                             
9 See CJEU (Grand Chamber) of 14 March 2017, case C-157/15, Samira Achbita and Centrum 
voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v G4S Secure Solutions NV, 
EU:C:2017:203; CJEU (Grand Chamber) of 14 March 2017, Case C-188/15, Asma Bougnaoui 
and Association de défense des droits de l’homme (ADDH) v Micropole SA, EU:C:2017:204; CJEU 
(Grand Chamber) of 29 May 2018, case C-426/16, Liga van Moskeeën en Islamitische 
Organisaties Provincie Antwerpen, VZW and Others v Vlaams Gewest, EU:C:2018:335. 
10 E.g. European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECHR), Eweida and Others v. the 
United Kingdom, application Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10, judgment of 
15 January 2013. 
11  E.g. ECHR, Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” v. Romania [GC], application No. 2330/09, 
judgment of 9 July 2013.  
12 See K. LENAERTS, The European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union: Creating Synergies, in the Field of Fundamental Rights Protection in Il Diritto 
dell’Unione Europea, 2018, p. 9 ss. 
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by the doctrine of direct effect,13 of central importance for the argument of 
the present essay. On the contrary, the ECHR has developed the doctrine 
of the margin of appreciation,14 that allows the Contracting Parties to enjoy 
a wider margin of discretion in the implementation of certain, specific, 
rights that are part of the Convention system. This might explains why the 
results of the protection afforded in the case law of the Court of Justice on 
discrimination and religious freedom are surely well below in number, but 
appears to ensure a higher standard of protection (although a similar 
statement is highly debatable). A last factor that has negatively impacted 
the amount of case law on religious discrimination and religious autonomy 
is the potential conflict between the content of the right at EU level and the 
content of the rights at constitutional level. In this sense, the recent case 
law of the Court of Justice15 has shown, although in different fields of 
European law, the necessity for an increased cooperation between the 
national and the European level in order to avoid misunderstandings that 
could end up with an ultra vires judgment by national constitutional 
courts.16  
 
1. The case of Vera Egenberger: non-discrimination and religious 
autonomy  
 
After the Achbita and Bougnauoi decisions and a few weeks before the Liga 
Van Moskeen case, 17  the Court of Justice has been asked to rule on 
Egenberger,18 a preliminary ruling coming from the Federal Labour Court 
of Germany. The circumstances of the case had to do with a person of no 
religious affiliation (of “no denomination”) applying for a fixed term 
position at the Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung (Protestant 
Agency for Diakonia and Development). The position entailed the 
preparation of a legal report on the UN International Convention on the 
                                                             
13 CJEU of 5 February 1963, case 26-62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming 
van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, EU:C:1963:1. 
14 E.g. S. GREER, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the European 
Convention of Human Rights, Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg, 2000.  
15 E.g., see CJEU of 19 April 2016, C-441/14, Dansk Industri (DI), acting on behalf of Ajos A/S 
v Estate of Karsten Eigil Rasmussen, EU:C:2016:278; CJEU of 5 December 2017, C-42/17, 
Criminal proceedings against M.A.S. and M.B., EU:C:2017:936.  
16 See Danish Supreme Court, judgment of 6 December 2016, Case 15/2014.  
17 The number of the decisions are quoted supra at 8. 
18 CJEU (Grand Chamber) of 17 April 2018, case C-414/16, Vera Egenberger v Evangelisches 
Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung e.V., EU:C:2018:257.  
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Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discriminations. In the job offer was 
clearly stated that the affiliation to one of the German Protestant Churches 
was considered as a pre-condition for taking up the job: “‘We presuppose 
membership of a Protestant church or a church belonging to the [Working Group 
of Christian Churches in Germany] and identification with the diaconal mission. 
Please state your church membership in your curriculum vitae”.19 This right of 
the religious employer to demand for a religious affiliation was also 
reflected by the German legislation.20 Paragraph 9 of the General Law on 
equal treatment (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz) – which implements 
Directive 2000/78/EC and in particular its Art. 4.2 - states that “difference 
of treatment on grounds of religion or belief […] shall also be permitted if a 
particular religion or belief constitutes a justified occupational requirement”. This 
“justified occupation requirement” corresponds to the “genuine, 
legitimate and justified occupational requirement” of Art. 4.2 of Directive 
2000/78/EC. As a preliminary remark, it should be noted that the scope of 
application of the exception in Para 9 of the Allgemeines 
Gleichbehandlungsgesetz seems to be wider than the one established by the 
Directive. This, in principle, seems to contradict the EU rules that establish 
that Member States enjoy discretion in the implementation of a directive. 
In this case seems that the German legislator has painted well outside the 
frame of the Directive. Art. 4.2 of the Directive provides in fact for a clear 
time frame for the operationalization of the exceptions on religious 
autonomy: “Member States may maintain national legislation in force at the date 
of adoption of this Directive or provide for future legislation incorporating 
national practices existing at the date of adoption of this Directive”. Para 9 of the 
Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz does not contain any kind of temporal 
limitation. This is a first factor to consider to contextualize the 
interpretation of the facts of the case to the cultural and social background. 
In Germany, the Cristian Churches (both Catholics and Protestants) are 
relevant and influential actors that, also thanks to a tax regime that 
provides for their financing, 21  are often acting as employers. Ms 
Egenberger action for damages against the refusal to employ was partly 
allowed – by the Berlin Labour Court (Arbeitsgericht Berlin) – and then 
                                                             
19 CJEU, Egenberger, para 25, cit. supra at 18. 
20 Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz (General Law on equal treatment) of 14 August 
2006 (BGBl. 2006 I, p. 1897). 
21 S. HOFFER, Caesar As God's Banker: Using Germany 's Church Tax As an Example of Non-
Geographically Bounded Taxing Jurisdiction in  Washington University Global Studies Law 
Review vol. 9, 595 ss. 
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dismissed by the Higher Labour Court for Berlin and Brandeburg 
(Landesarbeitsgericht Berlin-Brandenburg). 22  The Federal Labour Court, 
being court of last instance, decided to stay the proceeding and refer three 
questions for preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the EU in order 
to ascertain if the German legislation complies with Directive 2000/78/EC 
and in particular with its Article 4.2. 
 
2. The horizontal application of the principle of non-discrimination 
on the ground of religion  
 
The Egenberger judgment is a seminal decision, and for various reasons. 1) 
Represents another step towards the systematization of the horizontal 
application of direct effect and its relationship with indirect effect, 2) for 
the first time the Court of Justice is confronted with a balance between 
equality and religious freedom and 3) it tackles - again for the first time - 
the issue of the autonomy of religious organizations. For practical reasons, 
in the next sub-paragraphs we will divide this three-headed problem 
under two labels: in the first sub-paragraph, we will focus on the 
application of horizontal direct effect and indirect effect to this judgment. 
In the third sub-paragraph, after a second one devoted to the previous case 
law of the Court of Justice, we will try to understand the legal rationale of 
the Court of Justice, before going, in the last two paragraphs, into the 
discussion on the balance between religious autonomy and non 
discrimination and on the place of non discrimination in the EU 
constitutional legal order.  
 
a) The horizontal application of the principle of non-discrimination  
 
This decision gives the opportunity to reflect further on the development 
of the theory of direct effect by the Court of Justice of the EU and its 
application. The theory on direct effect has been created by the Court of 
Justice to ensure the effectiveness of EU law, entrusting individuals with 
the power to invoke provisions of EU legislative and non-legislative acts 
in front of national jurisdictions.23 The need to boost the effectiveness of 
                                                             
22 CJEU, Egenberger, para 29, cit. supra at 18. 
23 D. LECZYKIEWICZ, Effectiveness of EU Law before National Courts: Direct Effect, Effective 
Judicial Protection, and State Liability in D. CHALMERS and A. ARNULL (eds.) The Oxford 
Handbook of European Union Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015. 
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EU law came from the various limitations to its scope of application.24 
These limitations were linked to its hybrid nature, defined by the Court of 
Justice as a sui generis legal order.25 While the evolution of the European 
Union has increasingly led to a corpus of legislation (the acquis 
communautaire) that is independent from the national one, it is widely 
accepted in doctrine, although not unanimously, that certain legal 
instruments, as directives, are addressed towards the Member States and 
cannot as such impose obligations on EU citizens, but only rights.26 In cases 
as Egenberger, accordingly, where the case turns around the application 
and interpretation of a provision of national law in light of Directive 
2000/78/EC to a dispute between two individuals, the application and 
interpretation of the Directive would go against this rule, imposing to the 
Protestant Church the obligation to comply with EU legislation, that is 
responsibility of the German State. In a case such as the one we are 
analysing, the traditional interpretation of the theory of direct effect would 
leave to Ms Egenberger only one remedy: the action for State liability 
against Germany.27  
 
b) A summary of the previous case law on horizontal direct effect of 
the principle of non discrimination 
 
The Court of Justice has applied, over the years, the theory of direct effect 
also to general principles of law, and to the general principles of non-
discrimination.28 General principles of law are, according to the ICJ Statute, 
the principles of law that are common to the States. 29  Within EU law, 
general principles are defined under Art. 6 TEU, but more in detail within 
the case law of the Court of Justice. According to the view of many 
                                                             
24 E.g., see the examples of limitations to the scope of application of EU law: the internal 
market, the Charter, the persistence of the unanimity vote in the Council. 
25 CJEU of 25 February 1988, C-296/83, Parti Écologiste “Les Verts” v. European Parliament, 
EU:C:1988:94. 
26 E.g. see P. CRAIG, The legal effect of Directives: policy, rules and exceptions in European Law 
Review, 2009 vol. 3, p. 349 ss. 
27 This, however, taking into account the strict procedural and substantial rules to which 
this action is subjected in front of the Court of Justice. See A. DI MARCO, La responsabilità 
extracontrattuale dello stato per violazioni del diritto dell'UE, Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli, 
2017. 
28 P. CABRAL, R. NEVES, General Principles of EU Law and Horizontal Direct Effect, in 
European Public Law, 2011 vol. 3, 437 ss. 
29 Art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
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scholars, however, general principles of law are principles of 
interpretation, and does not seem to confer rights on individuals.30 This is 
the case of the general principle of non-discrimination, that the Court of 
Justice has used to confer rights on individuals in various occasions.31 If 
this conferral of rights, obtained through the application of the theory of 
direct effect, is applied within a dispute between an individual and a 
public administration, then in principle this does not represent a problem. 
If on the contrary this conferral happens within a dispute within two 
individuals, this enters into a conflict with the traditional theory of direct 
effect, as long as the legal instrument involved is a directive. To provide 
effectiveness to EU law, the Court of Justice has started to apply 
horizontally the principle of non-discrimination in various occasions.32 
This is linked to the fact that the anti-discrimination law of the European 
Union is governed by directives (if we except the Treaties and the Charter), 
and in particular by Directive 2000/78/EC and Directive 2000/43/EC. The 
first occasion in which the Court started to enforce the principle of non-
discrimination has been Mangold,33 where the Court has recognized that 
the principle of non-discrimination on the ground of age was applicable 
notwithstanding the inapplicability of Directive 2000/78/EC, since the 
dispute was involving two private parties. In Bartsch34 however the Court 
of Justice seemed to do a step back, declaring a situation similar to the one 
in Mangold not presenting a sufficient link with EU law to apply the 
principle of non-discrimination. Then in Kucukdeveci35 the Court of Justice 
                                                             
30 E.g. T. HARTLEY, The Foundations of European Union Law, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2010.  
31 See the reconstruction of the principle and the argument made in C. AMALFITANO, 
General Principles of EU law and the Protection of Fundamental Rights, Edward Elgar 
Publishing: London, 2018, p. 6. Si licet, see also G. ZACCARONI, Dialogue and conflict 
between supreme European courts in Dansk Industri in Federalismi, n. 9 2018. 
32 It should also be noted that the fact that general principles of law enjoys direct effect is 
present within EU law since the Defrenne case law, when the Court recognized that the 
general principle of non-discrimination was applicable to a dispute between two private 
parties. See CJEU of 8 April 1976, 43-75, Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de 
navigation aérienne Sabena [Defrenne II], EU:C:1976:56.  
33 CJEU of 22 November 2005, C-144/04, Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm, EU:C:2005:709. 
34 CJEU of 23 September 2008, C-427/06, Birgit Bartsch v Bosch und Siemens Hausgeräte (BSH) 
Altersfürsorge GmbH, EU:C:2008:517 
35  CJEU of 19 January 2010, C-555/07, Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co. KG., 
EU:C:2010:21. 
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did not follow the line of the “sufficient link” in Bartsch and went on with 
the Mangold approach. In Dansk Industri(DI)36, the Court of Justice resumed 
the Mangold approach, declaring, in a preliminary ruling received from the 
Danish Supreme Court (the highest jurisdictional authority in Denmark) 
that the principle of non-discrimination on the ground of age required the 
national judge to interpret the national legislation in order to ensure 
compliance with the prohibition of non-discrimination. In the event that 
the interpretation of the national legislation according to EU law was not 
possible, than the national court should have proceeded with the 
disapplication of the national legislation contrasting with the principle of 
non-discrimination. Until Egenberger, however, it was disputed if this 
approach was applicable only to discrimination on the ground of age or 
was, on the other side, applicable also to the other grounds of 
discrimination prohibited by the Treaties. This also in sight of the fact that, 
after Dansk Industri(DI), the Danish Supreme Court has declared as ultra 
vires the horizontal application of the principle of non-discrimination,37 for 
contrasting with the principle of conferred powers. In Egenberger, however, 
the Court of Justice decides to reaffirm, for discrimination on the ground 
of religion and belief, its case law on the principle of non-discrimination 
on the ground of age, reinforcing the opinion that the horizontal 
application of the principle non-discrimination is not a case by case 
approach of the Court of Justice but that it is rather a consistent application 
of a fundamental element of the EU constitutional legal order, and that 
might well be valid for all the grounds of discrimination protected by the 
Treaties. It is not by chance, perhaps, that the Court of Justice quotes Dansk 
Industri(DI) several times 38  along its legal rationale, demonstrating the 
validity of its previous case law even in spite of the ultra vires judgment of 
the Danish Supreme Court. 
 
c) Understanding the legal rationale of the Court of Justice 
 
The judgment of the Court of Justice in Egenberger gives the opportunity to 
reflect further also on the rationale behind the horizontal application of the 
principle non-discrimination. If in the previous Mangold-Kucukdeveci case 
law the Court was putting the emphasis on the disapplication of the 
national legislation contrasting with the principle of non-discrimination, in 
                                                             
36 See CJEU, Dansk Industri (DI), cit. supra at 15. 
37 See Danish Supreme Court, cit. supra at 16. 
38 CJEU, Egenberger, paras 71-72-73, cit. supra at 18. 
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Egenberger the Court underlines the fact that the horizontal application – 
which in any case is for the national court – should be resorted only if it is 
not possible to interpret the national legislation according to EU law, 
ensuring the “indirect effect”39 of legal instruments of EU law. According 
to the Court of Justice, first in Dansk Industri and then in Egenberger, the 
national court is deemed to disapply the contrasting national legislation 
even in the case this provision has been consistently interpreted in a 
manner that is incompatible with EU law.40  
 
i. The complex relationship between the principle of non-discrimination 
and other sources of EU law: a principle that is applied to supplement 
the directive? 
 
The principle of non-discrimination holds a particular place among the EU 
general principles. Although it cannot be held as being hierarchically 
above the others, it is one that has been accorded horizontal direct effect.41 
In order however to govern the (potentially) unlimited use of this principle 
at national level,42 the Court of Justice has attempted to link its use to 
                                                             
39 The indirect effect, as part of the doctrine of direct effect, states that while the EU 
primary legislation (in this case, a directive) is not applicable national courts have to 
interpret national legislation in accordance with EU law. CJEU of 10 April 1984, case 14/83, 
Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, EU:C:1984:153, para. 26. 
CJEU of 13 November 1990, C-106/89, Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de 
Alimentacion SA., EU:C:1990:395. See e.g. P. CRAIG, Direct Effect, Indirect Effect and the 
Construction of National Legislation in European Law Review, 1997, p. 519 ss. 
40 CJEU, Egenberger, para 73, cit. supra at 18. 
41  The principle of the protection of fundamental rights has been also declared 
horizontally directly effective. See the Kadi case law of the CJEU of 3 September 2008, 
joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation / 
Council and Commission, EU:C:2008:461. 
42 In this sense, the Court of Justice seems to be aware of the comments made by several 
national constitutional judges, reflected (inter alia) in A. BARBERA, La Carta dei diritti: per 
un dialogo fra la Corte italiana e la Corte di giustizia in Quaderni Costituzionali, 2018 vol. 1, p. 
149 ss. This stance reflects also the move made by the Italian Constitutional Court on dual 
preliminarity in late 2017 (Italian Constitutional Court, decision n. 269/2017, on which see 
P. FARAGUNA, Constitutional Rights First: The Italian Constitutional Court fine-tunes 
its "Europarechts-freundlichkeit, in Verfassungblog, 14 March 2018 and L. S. ROSSI, Il 
“triangolo giurisdizionale” e la difficile applicazione della sentenza 269/17 della Corte 
costituzionale italiana in Federalismi n. 16/2018), in order to ensure that the national courts, 
if the matter deals with a constitutional right, give precedence to the a quo constitutional 
legitimacy procedure instead of referring directly to the Court of Justice. This move, while 
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primary and secondary sources of law. In Egenberger, the Court of Justice 
has, in similar way to what the Court has been doing in Dansk Industri (DI) 
decided to put the emphasis on the relationship between, in first instance, 
the general principle of non-discrimination and the directive. In paragraph 
47 of the judgment, the Court of Justice holds that:  
 
“As regards, secondly, the objective of Directive 2000/78 and the context of 
Article 4(2) of the directive, it must be recalled that that directive’s objective, 
as stated in Article 1, is to lay down a general framework for combating 
discrimination on the grounds inter alia of religion or belief as regards 
employment and occupation, with a view to putting into effect in the Member 
States the principle of equal treatment. The directive is thus a specific 
expression, in the field covered by it, of the general prohibition of 
discrimination laid down in Article 21 of the Charter”.43 
 
The last sentence is of particular interest for the argument brought forward 
by the CJEU. The directive is “a the specific expression […] of the general 
prohibition of discrimination laid down in Article 21 of the Charter”. This phrase 
seems to be in line with what the Court has affirmed previously in Dansk 
Industri:  
 
“It should then be noted that, as Directive 2000/78 does not itself lay down 
the general principle prohibiting discrimination on grounds of age but simply 
gives concrete expression to that principle in relation to employment and 
occupation, the scope of the protection conferred by the directive does not go 
beyond that afforded by that principle”.44 
 
In both cases, the Court states that the Directive is the expression of the 
general prohibition non-discrimination, and, in particular in Dansk 
Industri, it seems to regard the general principle as an unwritten source of 
law. This has no consequences for the legal status of the Directive, nor it 
has, as commentators or national Courts might argue, for the principle of 
conferred powers. It states that the principle of non-discrimination is the 
rationale and the background of the Directive, confirming the special place 
that the principle retains in the EU legal order. This however has 
                                                             
protecting the Italian system of constitutional review, might have consequences in light 
of the role of national judges as EU judges, as well as on the effectiveness of the 
preliminary ruling procedure.  
43 CJEU, Egenberger, para 47, cit. supra at 18. 
44 CJEU, Dansk Industri, para 27, cit. supra at 15. 
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consequences on the position and on the rights of the parties in the dispute. 
The principle of non-discrimination is, in Egenberger as well as in Dansk 
Industri (DI), applicable precisely because the Directive is not applicable 
and it is not possible, in the opinion of the national court, to interpret 
national legislation in conformity with EU law. In Dansk Industri (DI) the 
Court repeats the need to disapply contrasting national legislation when it 
is not possible to interpret it in conformity with EU law:  
 
“That point having been made clear, it should be added that even if a national 
court seised of a dispute that calls into question the general principle 
prohibiting discrimination on grounds of age, as given concrete expression 
in Directive 2000/78, does in fact find it impossible to arrive at an 
interpretation of national law that is consistent with the directive, it is 
nonetheless under an obligation to provide, within the limits of its 
jurisdiction, the legal protection which individuals derive from EU law and 
to ensure the full effectiveness of that law, disapplying if need be any 
provision of national legislation contrary to that principle (judgment in 
Kücükdeveci, C‑ 555/07, EU:C:2010:21, paragraph 51)”.45 
 
This argument is developed further in paragraph 36:  
“Moreover, it is apparent from paragraph 47 of the judgment in Association 
de médiation sociale (C-176/12, EU:C:2014:2) that the principle prohibiting 
discrimination on grounds of age confers on private persons an individual 
right which they may invoke as such and which, even in disputes between 
private persons, requires the national courts to disapply national provisions 
that do not comply with that principle”.46 
In Egenberger the Court expresses a very similar position and takes the 
argument of the link between the Directive and the principle of non-
discrimination farther:  
 
“In the event that it is impossible to interpret the national provision at issue 
in the main proceedings in conformity with EU law, it must be pointed out, 
first, that Directive 2000/78 does not itself establish the principle of equal 
treatment in the field of employment and occupation, which originates in 
various international instruments and the constitutional traditions common 
to the Member States, but has the sole purpose of laying down, in that field, 
a general framework for combating discrimination on various grounds, 
                                                             
45 CJEU, Dansk Industri, para 35, cit. supra at 15. 
46 CJEU, Dansk Industri, para 36, cit. supra at 15. 
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including religion and belief, as may be seen from its title and from Article 
1”.47 
 
From these reflections we can draw a preliminary conclusion: in the 
opinion of the Court of Justice (which, as we know, has been strongly 
confronted by national Constitutional Courts), the principle of non-
discrimination is an autonomous source of rights, to the extent that it can 
be applied when a legal instrument (a Directive) of the EU is not per se 
applicable and it is not possible to interpret the national legislation 
according to EU law. 
 
ii. A principle that has been codified by the Charter? 
 
The reading of the legal reasoning of the Court of Justice in Egenberger leads 
however to a step further in providing the rationale of the direct effect of 
Directives: 
 
“The prohibition of all discrimination on grounds of religion or belief is 
mandatory as a general principle of EU law. That prohibition, which is laid 
down in Article 21(1) of the Charter, is sufficient in itself to confer on 
individuals a right which they may rely on as such in disputes between them 
in a field covered by EU law”.48 
 
While in its previous case law the Court of Justice, to give reasons about 
the application of the general principle, made reference to its nature of 
independent source of rights, in Egenberger takes a different decision. The 
Court maintains that the prohibition of all discriminations on the grounds 
of religion or belief “is laid down in Article 21(1) of the Charter”. In the 
opinion of the Court of Justice is the Charter itself, rather than the 
Directive,49 that justifies the horizontal application of the general principle 
of non-discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief. It should be 
noted that, according to the case law of the Court of Justice as well as to 
Art. 51 of the Charter itself, for the Charter to be applicable is necessary 
that 1) the matter falls within its scope of application and 2) since the 
Charter is addressed to the Member States, that the dispute involves at 
least one public administration or a subject with a link with the State 
                                                             
47 CJEU, Egenberger, para 75, cit. supra at 18. 
48 CJEU, Egenberger, para 76, cit. supra at 18. 
49  Although the Court of Justice, as said in the paragraph before, also mentions the 
Directive 2000/78/EC. 
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administration. While we know that the Court of Justice maintains that the 
condition under point 1) is satisfied, the Court still seems not to clarify 
why, again, the principle should be applied to a dispute where the Charter 
should not be applied (point 2). The reason might be that, as the Court of 
Justice maintains in Dansk Industri(DI), we are handling a principle that 
enjoys a particular, sui generis, status in the EU constitutional legal order:  
“the fundamental principle of equal treatment, the general principle 
prohibiting discrimination on grounds of age being merely a specific 
expression of that principle”.50  
3. The balance between equality and religious autonomy 
 
These first paragraphs allow to see in perspective the relationship between 
equality and religious autonomy. Although it is the first time that the Court 
of Justice has been called to interpret Art. 4.2 of Directive 2000/78/EC, in 
the last years the Court of Justice has been asked several times to judge on 
religious freedom and on discrimination on the ground of religion. The 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has already developed its own 
case law on various aspects of equality and religious belief, under the scope 
of Art. 9 of the Convention,51 Art. 10 of the Convention52 as well as on 
religious autonomy with decisions on Art. 11 53  and on Art. 8. 54  The 
protection of fundamental rights offered by Council of Europe, although 
presenting several similarities, is different from the one of the European 
Union. According to the case law of the Strasbourg Court, the High 
Contracting Parties enjoy a wider margin of discretion when two rights 
which are at the core of the protection offered by the Convention enters 
into conflict, as equality and religious freedom.  Hence, in the Convention 
system, the choice of the Contracting Parties to let prevail in turn religious 
autonomy 55  or equality 56  is usually upheld. This is due to the main 
                                                             
50 CJEU, Dansk Industri (DI), para 26, cit. supra at 15. 
51 ECHR, Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, cit. supra at 10. 
52 ECHR, Lombardi Vallauri v Italy, application No. 39128/05, judgment of 20 October 2009.  
53 ECHR, Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” v. Romania [GC], cit. supra at 11. In this case the 
ECHR found no violation of Art. 11 of the Convention. 
54 ECHR, Fernandez Martinez v. Spain [GC], application No. 56030/07, judgment of 12 June 
2014. Equally, in this decision the ECHR found no violation of Art. 8 of the Convention, 
because of the religious autonomy of the religious organization involved.  
55 See Fernandez Martinez, cit. supra at 53. 
56 See ECHR, Leila Sahin v Turkey, Application no. 44774/98, judgment of 29 June 2004. 
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technique used by the Strasbourg Court to solve conflict of rights, the 
doctrine of the margin of appreciation. 57  Through this technique, the 
European Court of Human Rights has governed the exercise of this 
discretion by the High Contracting Parties, balancing competing rights 
with a result that has often been questioned.58 In front of the Court of 
Justice, however, the possibility to obtain deeper review is higher, since, 
although the discretion of the Member States is appreciated, the Court of 
Justice has demonstrated, over the years, to be committed to defend in 
various ways the specific and distinctive elements of the EU legal order. 
Egenberger is no exception, since the Court holds that the conditions 
established by Art. 4.2 of Directive 2000/78/EC are to be interpreted in a 
narrow way. In order for a religious organisation to take profit of the 
exception of religious autonomy, the genuine, legitimate and justified 
occupational requirement by the employer should be necessary and 
objectively dictated by the nature of the occupational activity concerned or 
the circumstances in which it is carried out, and cannot cover 
considerations which have no connection with that ethos or with the right 
of autonomy of the church or organization. 59  The Court of Justice is 
accordingly suggesting that, albeit in very exceptional circumstances, the 
balance between equality and religious autonomy should be resolved in 
favour of equality. A further confirmation of this trend can be found in 
Achbita,60 where the Court maintained that even a neutral policy addressed 
into limiting the display of religious symbols in a working environment 
can be regarded as an indirect discrimination.  
                                                             
57 Cfr. M. LUGATO, The "Margin of Appreciation" and Freedom of Religion: Between Treaty 
Interpretation and Subsidiarity in Journal of Catholic Legal Studies, 2017 vol. 52, p. 43 ss. R. 
SAPIENZA, L’interpretazione della Convenzione tra margine d’apprezzamento e vincolo di 
interpretazione conforme. Profili sistematici in F. SALERNO, R. SAPIENZA (a cura di), La 
Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo e il giudice italiano, Giappichelli, Torino, 2011, p. 169 
ss. M. DELMAS-MARTY, M.L. IZORCHE, Marge nationale d'appréciation et 
internationalisation du droit. Réflexions sur la validité formelle d'un droit commun pluraliste in 
Revue internationale de droit comparé, 2000 vol. 4, p. 753 ss. esp. 763.  
58  O.M. ARNARDOTTIR, Rethinking the Two Margins of Appreciation in European 
Constitutional Law Review, 2016, p. 27ss. See in particular the reconstruction and the 
literature review of the margin of appreciation doctrine at p. 28-29. 
59 CJEU, Egenberger, cit. supra at 18, para 69. 
60 See Achbita, cit. supra at 9, in particular para. 35, where the Court of Justice maintains 
that it is not inconceivable that the national referring court rules that a neutral policy 
which forbids the display of religious symbols in the working place might be indirectly 
discriminatory against “active” religious symbols, as the veil. 
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4. Some reflections over the importance of the principle of non-
discrimination on the ground of religion for the EU constitutional 
legal order 
 
As we have learned through this analysis of the case law of the Court of 
Justice, the principle of non-discrimination is a sui generis general principle. 
It is an autonomous source of rights, and, although the Court of Justice has 
attempted to reconcile it with the primary sources of law of the European 
Union, it seems to enjoy a specific place among the sources of EU law. This 
“constitutive” value of the principle of non-discrimination, affirmed for the 
first time on the ground of age and now on the ground on religion, is linked 
to the role that the “fundamental principle of equal treatment” plays in the 
EU constitutional legal order. The prohibition of non-discrimination has 
been, since the outset of the European Coal and Steel Community and of 
the European Economic Community, the medium iuris through which the 
Court and the EU institutions have shaped the internal market. After its 
completion in 1992 and 1997, the very same principle is now forging the 
construction of the “ever closer Union”,61 that reflected the vision of the 
EU founding fathers: the synthesis between economic and social Europe. 
The fact that the Court of Justice rules that the balancing between non-
discrimination on the ground of religion and religious freedom is to be, 
pursuant to European law, resolved in favour of the first, and that the 
contrasting national legislation should be disapplied (provided that the 
national judge does not find an interpretation of the national legislation 
that complies with EU law), reveals that, differently from what has been 
maintained, for instance, by the European Court of Human Rights, non-
discrimination can prevail over religious autonomy. The decision in 
Egenberger allows us also to reflect on the place of the principle of non 
discrimination on the ground of religion among the sources of EU law. The 
primacy of non discrimination over the autonomy of religious 
organisations is relevant in two senses: first, it allows to state that the 
principle of non discrimination is an autonomous source of law. Second, 
that the importance of the principle in the EU legal order leaves much less 
room for the autonomy of religious organisations.  This in particular – as 
                                                             
61 Solemn Declaration on European Union. European Council, Stuttgart 19 June 1983. 
Bulletin of the European Communities, No. 6/1983, 24-29. 
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in Egenberger62 - when the genuine occupational requirement that allows to 
derogate from the prohibition of non-discrimination present no actual link 
with the job description.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
According to what we have been going through, the Court of Justice in 
Egenberger has reinforced and reaffirmed the interpretation of the general 
principle of non-discrimination as a “fundamental element” of the EU 
constitutional legal order. This précising the previous case law in Mangold, 
Kucukdeveci and Dansk Industri (DI), where the principle of non-
discrimination appeared to be applicable without a link to primary EU 
legislation. In Egenberger the Court of Justice moves forward, underlining 
that the principle is now enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the EU. This tries to reconcile with the objection to its application made 
by the Danish Supreme Court, that retained the general principle an 
unwritten law, unable to produce effects on the legal position of 
individuals without violating the principle of conferred powers.63 At the 
same time, the limitation to the use of Art. 4.2 of Directive 2000/78/EC, 
underlining the need for judicial review of the decisions of the Churches 
when examining jobs applicants and advocating for a strict interpretation 
of the notion of “genuine occupational requirement” suggests that the 
Court of Justice has a clear solution to the balance between the two 
competing rights and that it will be very difficult for the national court to 
provide a different solution. At the same time, however, the position of the 
Court of Justice calls into question a balance between two competing 
fundamental rights at European and national level. If the national judge 
decides to ask to the Bundesverfassungericht if this balance of rights 
complies with the German Constitution, then there will be another open 
confrontation that will lead to an uncertain end. It should be also taken into 
account that the reference made to the link with the Charter does not seem 
to reinforce the legal reasoning of the Court of Justice much more than the 
                                                             
62 See also the recent IR v JQ case, CJEU (Grand Chamber) of 11 September 2018, case C-
68/17, IR v JQ, EU:C:2018:696. 
63  Danish Supreme Court, cit. supra at 15. See in particular p. 47 (English version – 
translation courtesy of the DSC): “In summary, we accordingly find that the Law on 
accession does not provide the legal basis to allow the unwritten principle prohibiting 
discrimination on grounds of age to take precedence over Paragraph 2a(3) of the Law on 
salaried employees in so far as the provision is contrary to the prohibition”. 
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previous mention of Directive 2000/78/EC as being an expression of the 
general principle of non-discrimination. This decision is a confirmation 
that the Court of Justice regards the principle of non-discrimination on the 
ground of religion as a fundamental element of the EU constitutional legal 
order. By virtue of the primacy of EU law, this should suffice for the 
national judges to enforce this decision at national level. But the limit of 
the national constitutional rights and their interpretation might well be 
there, and in the event of another decision like the Dansk Industri one of the 
Danish Supreme Court, the Court of Justice will have no weapons to fight.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Egenberger, o del ruolo del divieto di discriminazione sulla base della 
religione nell'ordinamento costituzionale dell'Unione Europea 
 
Abstract: Il divieto di ogni discriminazione occupa un posto speciale 
all'interno delle fonti del diritto costituzionale dell'Unione europea, al 
punto che la Corte di Giustizia ne ha assicurato l'applicazione ben al di là 
dei limiti previsti dal diritto primario. La Corte di giustizia ha, infatti, 
garantito l'applicazione del divieto di discriminazione nei confronti delle 
categorie protette in casi in cui lo strumento giuridico preso in 
considerazione, soprattutto direttive, non sarebbe stato applicabile. È 
questo il caso in cui la Corte di giustizia ha applicato il divieto di 
discriminazione ad una controversia tra privati, avverando quello che 
solitamente viene definito come l'effetto diretto orizzontale degli strumenti 
giuridici del diritto dell'Unione. Come nella recente sentenza della Corte 
di giustizia dell'Unione europea, Egenberger, dove una candidata per una 
posizione lavorativa riguardante una consulenza legale in materia di diritti 
fondamentali in una associazione affiliata alla Chiesa Protestante Tedesca 
ha impugnato il rifiuto di assumerla del datore di lavoro. La decisione della 
Corte di applicare il principio di non discriminazione sulla base della 
religione può dunque considerarsi un tentativo di affermare il valore 
specifico e fondamentale che ha il principio di non discriminazione 
nell'ordinamento costituzionale dell'Unione? E quale è il rapporto fra 
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principio di uguaglianza e la libertà religiosa? Questo saggio tenterà di 
rispondere a queste domande. 
 
Parole chiave: Unione Europea, religione, uguaglianza, autonomia 
religiosa, principio 
